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Real Interest Rates
In his latest Humphrey-Hawkins testimony before
Congress, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan
suggested that real interest rates could come to
playa larger role in the formulation of monetary
policy. This Weekly Letter discusses what that
role might be and describes what we know about
the behavior of short-term real rates in the U.S.
since the 1960s. Our review suggests that while
it is unlikely that real interest rates will provide
information about how to conduct policy in the
short run, they are likely to be useful in helping
to avoid policy settings that are untenable in the
long run.
Real rates and policy
The real rate of interest can be defined as the
nominal rate minus the expected rate of inflation.
Thus, if the nominal rate on 3-month T-bills is 4
percent, and the expected rate of inflation is
3 percent, then the real rate on 3-month T-bills
would be 1 percent. Real rates are important
because they provide a measure of the value of
resourcestoday versus tomorrow (abstracting from
inflation), so they playa central role in people's
decisions about saving, consuming, and invest-
ing. Therefore, real rates figure prominently in
most kinds of models of the macroeconomy, as
well as in discussions of how monetary policy
affects the economy.
In thinking about the role of real interest rates in
monetary policy it is useful to have a concept of
the equilibrium real rate. For our purposes the
equilibrium real rate can be defined as the rate
that would equate economy-wide demand and
supply in the long run, once short-run disturb-
ances have worked themselves out. Factors that
shift demand or supply could cause this rate to
vary over time. For instance, the equilibrium real
rate would rise if individuals decided to consume
more today and reduce the amount they had
been saving for the future.
The Fed cannot keep the real interest rate away
from its equilibrium level in the long run without
generating either an acceleration or a decelera-
tion in inflation. Consider, for example, what
would happen ifthe Fed tried to keep the real
rate artificially low. An increase in the rate of
money growth initially would push down both
real and nominal interest rates, given that the in-
f1ation rate would not adjust at once to the higher
money growth. However, faster money growth
would raise inflation expectations eventually, so
the inflation rate would adjust as would interest
rates. To keep real interest rates artificially low,
the Fed would need to raise the rate of money
growth further; of course, then the rate of in-
flation would rise further and the whole cycle
would begin again. It turns out that this de-
scription of what would happen ifthe Fed tried
to keep real interest rates too low is not entirely
hypothetical; the Fed's attempts to stimulate
the economy during the 19705 (through what
amounted to a policy of extremely low real inter-
est rates) led to steadily rising inflation that was
finally checked at great cost during the 1980s.
Thus, historical experience suggests that the Fed
would not find the real interest rate a useful tar-
get. This does not mean that the real rate cannot
be used in the policymaking process; the Fed
could still use it as an indicator-that is, the
Fed could use the information contained in
the real interest rate to help determine the ap-
propriate stance of policy.
However, usingthe real rate of interest as a mon-
etary policy indicatoris not a straightforward task
either. For one thing, it is difficult to determine
what the equilibrium rate is at any point in time,
because real interest rates are affected by many
factors. To get a sense of how many different
factors may be involved, consider how many dif-
ferent explanations have been offered for the un-
usually high real rates of the 1980s. Among the
candidates: tighter monetary policy, easier fiscal
policy, an increase in the rate of return to capital,
a slow adjustment of expectations to declining
inflation, as well as the savings and loan crisis..
Short-term real rates since1960
In view of these problems it may seem that we
could get a better sense of the equilibrium level
of real rates simply by looking at the historical
data we have. Butthings are not so straightfor-
ward there either. One problem is that we cannot
observe the real rate that is likely to be most rele-
vant to decisionmaking. An individual's decisionFRBSF
about whether to borrow money, for example, is
based on the real rate of interest she expects to
pay at the time she borrows the money; that is, it
is the nominal rate less the rate of inflation ex-
pected over the life ofthe loan. Economists call
this the ex ante real rate. Since we cannot ob-
serve this rate directly, we must resort to making
an estimate about the public's expectation of in-
flation over the relevant horizon and then sub-
tracting this estimate from the observed nominal
rate. Errors in estimating expected inflation trans-
late into errors in estimating the real rate. Further,
since inflation in the near term (say over the next
three months) is easier to predict than inflation
in the long run (say over ten years), estimates of
long-term real rates are likely to be more prob-
lematic than estimates of short-term real rates.
Keeping these caveats in mind, we now turn to
the data itself. The figure plots the nominal and
estimated real interest rates on 3-month Treasury
bills since 1960. The estimate of the real rate was
constructed by subtracting expected inflation from
the nominal rate, with expected inflation mod-
eled as a function of lagged inflation alone. The
shaded areas represent recessions.
Over this period, the nominal rate has been
rather volatile, ranging between 3 and 16 per-
cent. Although the real rate is less volatile than
the nominal rate, it does tend to move around
quite a bit. Further, shocks to the 3-month real
rate appear to persist for a long time, and the rate
shows little tendency to return to a central value
or mean; that is, it appears to be "nonstationary:'
Empirical studies on the issue are divided, with
some concluding that the real rate is nonstation-
ary while others disagree.
!f rea! rates are nonstationary, then the concept of
the equilibrium real rate would have little opera-
tional significance for monetary policy. For ex-
ample, a fall in the measured real rate could be
the result of a permanent decline in the equilib-
rium real rate, in which case it would have no
implication for the stance of monetary policy; or
it could be the result of easy monetary policy, in
which case it would suggest that monetary pol-
icymakers would need to reverse direction at
some point in the future.
Even if real rates are not strictly nonstationary,
the figure indicates that it still would be difficult
to devise an operational measure ofthe equi-
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rate shows a tendency to hover around different
values for extended periods oftime. One can
make outat least three different phases in the
figure.The first phase coincides roughly with
the 1960s, when real rateswere low but positive,
and averaged 1.7 percent. The second covers the
1970s, when real rates were generally negative,
and averaged - 0.9 percent. Short real rates
were noticeably higher in the 1980s, when they
averaged 3.1 percent. Real rates have averaged
0.9 percent in the 1990s, although it is too soon
to tell whether this marks a new phase. Some re-
searchers have suggested that the change in the
behavior of real rates (especially from the 1970s
to the 1980s) is associated with a change in the
monetary policy regime; however, others have
pointed out that similar regime changes in other
countries have not had the same impact. (See
Bonser-Neal 1990 for a discussion.)
Short-term real interest rates show little evidence
of systematic variation over the cycle, once these
longer-run patterns are allowed for. Thus, real
rates were low but positive during the two reces-
sions over the 1960s (averaging less than 1 per-
cent in the two recessions), negative during the
1973-1975. recession (averaging - 4.2 percent),
and noticeably high during the 1981-1982 reces-
sion (averaging 4.4 percent). This behavior is not
surprising, given that different factors are likely
responsible for different recessions. Thus, it is
generally agreed that the 1981-1982 recession
was caused by tighter monetary policy, whichwould tend to push up real rates in the short run.
By contrast, adverse supply shocks are believed
to have played a larger role in the 1973-1975
recession; these shocks as well as the generally
easier policy followed by the Fed during this
period would tend to reduce real rates in the
short run. In general, then, it seems difficult to
predict how short real rates would behave over
the cycle without further information about what
was going on.
Could nominal rates be used to infer the under-
lying behavior of real rates? A look at the figure
shows that the answer is no, since the two do
not move in the same way relative to each other.
Once again, this is not surprising, since different
factors will have different effects on the two rates.
Rising inflation in the 1970s, for example, was
associated with higher nominal rates but lower
real rates. This negative relationship between real
rates and inflation has been noted by various re-
searchers for other time periods and other coun-
tries as well, but has not been satisfactorily
explained. (See, for instance, Mishkin 1988.) By
contrast, real and nominal rates moved closely
together over the 1979-1982 period, when the
Fed moved nominal rates to combat inflation.
Note also that real and nominal rates have moved
closely together since the mid-1980s, implying
thatinflation expectations have not changed
much over the period.
Conclusions and policy implications
Real interest rates are affected by a large number
of factors, and it is difficultto know where the
"equilibrium rate" would be at any point in time.
The problem is made worse by the fact that the
ex ante real rate cannot be observed directly.
Having to estimate these rates naturally intro-
duces error into this process.
The fact that we are uncertain about the equi-
librium rate does not mean that real rates have
no role to play in setting monetary policy. While
it is difficult to determine the correct level of real
interest rates at any point in time, it is easier to
tell whether a given level of rates is outside some
reasonable range. For example, if there is one
clear lesson for monetary policy from the 1970s,
it is that short-term real rates should not be
forced below zero for long periods. Thus, while
it is unlikely that real interest rates can be used
to provide a day-to-day guide for monetary pol-
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